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Diagnosing the Third World: The “Map Doctor” and the Spatialized Discourses of Disease 
and Development in the Cold War 
 
ABSTRACT: In the early 1950s, the American Geographical Society, in collaboration with the 
United States Armed Forces and international pharmaceutical corporations, instituted a Medical 
Geography program whose main initiative was the Atlas of Disease, a map series that 
documented the global spread of various afflictions such as polio, malaria, even starvation. The 
Atlas of Disease, through the stewardship of its director, Jacques May, a French-American 
physician trained in colonial Hanoi, evidenced the ways in which cartography was rhetorically 
appropriated in the Cold War as a powerful visual discourse of development and modernization, 
wherein both the data content of the maps and their stylistic forms collaborated to produce a 
compelling division between the so-called First and Third Worlds. In addition, the atlas’ 
connections between the academic knowledge production of the AGS, the national security 
interests of the US government, and the market building of the medical industry displayed the 
ways in which development was a multi-layered and essentially spatialized discourse of 
American power and ideology.  
 
In May 1954, mere days after Vietnam officially ended its tenure as a French colony and 
two months before it was fatefully partitioned in half, Newsweek magazine ran a curious column 
in its “News in Medicine” section. The article was a brief profile of Dr. Jacques May, the head of 
the American Geographical Society’s (AGS) Medical Geography department, featuring a 
headline proclaiming May as “The Map Doctor.”1 Next to a photograph of May with arms folded 
over a large globe centered on the Eastern hemisphere, and Southeast Asia in particular, the 
article detailed the native-French doctor’s rise from a colonial post in Hanoi as a physician and 
educator to the prime surveyor of the geographical spread of disease across the earth. In 
particular, the piece commemorated May’s completion of the twelfth volume of his Atlas of 
Disease (AOD), an AGS project sponsored by the United States Office of Naval Research and 
touted by Newsweek as the “first comprehensive record, in maps and charts, of the world-wide 
distribution of human ailments.”2 Eventually the Atlas of Disease would include seventeen maps, 
from cholera and leprosy even to starvation, and by the end of the 1950s it would be put to use in 
scientific, military, commercial, and popular contexts. 
 During an era of rapid decolonization and the emergence of new self-determining nations 
across the so-called Third World, the United States found itself managing the frantic flow of new 
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information about these countries and having to produce knowledge about them at a torrid pace.3 
A three-tiered world of developed and developing nations provided the organizational structure 
for the Cold War of the late 1940s and 1950s, and the emerging nations were quickly categorized 
in this new system, particularly into a Third World that was conceived as a testing ground for 
democratic or communist ideologies.4 America’s national security apparatus, both in the military 
and the State department, was weighing how to negotiate America’s Cold War role in the world, 
and it was clear that the “South” was going to be a prime determinant of that role. It went almost 
unquestioned that “modernization” would be the best method by which to “help” self-
determining nations reach political, social, and economic stability at the standards of the United 
States and Europe (preferably before the Soviet Union could wield its persuasive influence over 
the same nations). This ideology of development was inherently spatial. In geographer David 
Slater’s terms, “the geography of modernization was presented as an exercise in establishing the 
means for spatially integrating the traditional zones of the developing countries into the national 
and international circuits of the modernizing world.”5  
 Beyond a mere Newsweek curiosity, May’s project articulates the collaborative nexus of 
US military, foreign policy institutions, and the scientific community’s interests in surveying and 
classifying Third World nations. The seventeen maps of May’s Atlas of Disease circulated into 
conferences for the influential Council on Foreign Relations, into boardroom pitch sessions at 
corporations like Pfizer, into Congressional reports on the viability of the Mutual Security Act, 
and into the hands of military advisers in areas like Vietnam. Thus, the AOD’s maps lived 
eventful lives as what Bruno Latour once called “immutable mobiles”; these maps of disease 
inscribed complex scientific information, ideologies, and values into a seemingly finished and 
unchangeable cartographic visualization, even as they moved fluidly through the complex 
contexts of Cold War culture.6 As David Campbell writes, “foreign policy might be likened to an 
‘ethical power of segregation,’ whereby moral distinctions can be made through spatial and 
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temporal delineations, constituting a ‘geography of evil’ that allows dangers to be understood as 
originating from distinct and distant places.”7 By filling the abstract cartographic spaces of the 
world with a swathe of colors and dots representing both past, present, and impending disease, 
the Atlas of Disease segregates the so-called “Third World” into a distinct place of sickness. The 
Northern nations are by no means free of sickness on these maps, but the contrast in scale and 
scope between the appearance of disease above and below the equator is stark. Therefore, disease 
and pestilence serve as markers of both temporal and spatial boundaries between the North and 
South of the Cold War. And with eventful circulation of the Atlas of Disease maps into 
institutional and popular spaces of the Cold War, illness becomes a cultural, economic, and 
political contagion that blots areas of strategic interest all over the world, at a period when more 
and more remote areas were seen as strategic ground. 
Of course, the fact that cartography became a central medium for this kind of valuable 
data was not incidental or random. Post-WWII, maps were emerging as prime articulators of 
American international power. Serving the interests of the state was not, obviously, a new role 
for them. But what was new was the scale at which maps could encompass global data, fitting to 
match the entirely global stakes of the Cold War. As the scope of American commitments 
broadened all over the world, from a rhetorical standpoint cartographers had to adapt and 
broaden maps to encompass such commitments. What Cold War cartography communicated was 
that all areas of the earth might be potentially strategic. To see the world in one glance from the 
standpoint of one’s interests allowed for a powerful political perspective. In the particular case of 
the Atlas of Disease, the modern cartographic style of the American Geographical Society, which 
was built on innovative projections and a technical but accessible approach to data visualization 
on a global scale, tended to match its message—an important demonstration of the fusion of 
form and content. At the same time, the AOD project, underwritten by different institutions of the 
American government, reproduced and recirculated this perspective into the discourse of the 
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Cold War. Certainly, the production of knowledge by the AOD was central to its purpose, but so 
was its function as a vehicle for communicating a cohesive view of the world for strategic 
American interests and the values of modernization to a diversity of audiences. For Michael 
Shapiro, 
[M]odern “security” represents the ultimate in leaving nothing to chance. The number 
and intensity of interests congregated in modern super powers, for example, has resulted 
in a comprehensive level of surveillance and intervention all over the globe. Within this 
intensification of the security-oriented gaze, the meanings of landscapes and people 
everywhere are subjected to an intensified form of objectification.8  
A map, then, provided a fitting medium for a logic of intervention and the objectification of 
world space, as it abstracts borders, shapes, and area into one readable, intensely concentrated, 
and sanitized image that can be reproduced and reappropriated. 
It is at this tense meeting, then, between the function of maps as powerful partitioners of 
North/South identity and perspective, and the context of America’s shift to a fully global and 
interdependent sense of security, where this essay resides. May’s project did not simply advance 
a scientifically viable collaboration between medicine and cartography. His work also evidenced 
complex contradictions and interests that were indicative of an anxiety in America’s Cold War 
discourse about the role of developing nations. Therefore, I argue in this essay that May’s maps 
perpetuate an ideology of modernization and progressive development that accompanied 
America’s rise to international power in the Cold War through a visual rhetoric that legitimizes a 
fear of illness and contamination in America’s construction of the Third World. At the same time, 
the actual circulation of these maps and the discourse around them both complicated and 
intensified that power. As various institutions appropriated the maps for humanitarian 
development, medical innovation, military maneuvers, and pharmaceutical profit, the case of the 
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AOD evidences the range and compatibility of a host of Cold War discourses. These functions 
are consonant with Kirsten Ostherr’s claim that  
the aim of global health surveillance is to trace visually the spread of contagious disease, 
thereby sustaining the imaginary geopolitical map that establishes a spatial and temporal 
evolutionary gap between the scientifically advanced “modern” world (of the West), and 
the disease-ridden “premodern” world (the rest of the globe). Such maps reify the literal 
and figurative relationship between these two worlds as that of scientific investigator and 
lab specimen.9 
These arguments engage especially with two important conversations in rhetorical 
studies: scholarship advancing cartography’s role in the rhetorical construction of political space, 
and the rich tradition of critical Cold War studies. First, this essay builds on Lawrence Prelli’s 
conception of maps as “rhetorics of display” that operate through a tension between “revealing” 
and “concealing.” 10 The immense amount of medical data on display in AOD maps mostly 
conceals the bodies of the diseased, as the ideological borders between North and South go 
unseen for the sake of promoting a clean science of modernization on the flat page. Thus, 
according to this essay, maps have unique inventional resources in projection, iconography, color 
etc. that “naturalize” their political claims. At the same time, while the map’s “display” should 
remain in focus, so equally should its circulation. Amy Propen has argued how maps serve as 
powerful material documents that perpetuate specific perspectives of the world as they are 
passed around, debated, and revised.11 In the case of the Atlas of Disease maps, then, their 
production processes and circulation show that the control and surveillance of the Third World in 
the decolonizing era was an active process that required rhetorical labor. 
This kind of labor also speaks to an important implication of this essay for Cold War 
rhetoric scholars. Much has been said about the rhetorical presidency and its role in articulating 
American power in the second half of the twentieth century, and this work remains vital and 
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relevant. However, the AOD case reveals that the constitution of the Third World as a particular 
set of power relations instituted by First World elites was also a consequence of the more mid-
level work of both public and private academic and government collaborators. Since the Cold 
War was waged not only through the executive branch but through fruitful (official and 
unofficial) connections between academic science, defense organizations, and private 
corporations, this essay suggests that Cold War scholars benefit from tracing the kinds of 
artifacts, like maps, that lived “rhetorical lives” across all of these complex institutions. Thus, 
these cross-circulations exemplify rhetorics of foreign policy, development, and national security 
as practices. Relatedly, an important implication for rhetorical scholars is that the strategic, 
realist approach to the Cold War is best seen as intertwined with (and complicated by) the 
ideological approach.12 While the AOD, for example, can be well understood through Francis 
Beer and Robert Hariman’s critique of strategic realism, in that the maps were used to manage 
some resolutely American Cold War concerns, the project should also be approached from a 
broader ideological perspective around postwar liberal and technocratic values.13 AGS 
representatives arguably conceived the AOD project just as much as an initiative to protect 
American interests as they did a sophisticated scientific innovation that could raise the standards 
of the developing world. And for historian Odd Arne Westad, since Washington’s objectives to 
modernize the Third World “were not exploitation or subjection, but control and improvement,” 
American Cold War elites exhibited a “genuine and deeply held ideological” social 
consciousness.14 Thus, the integration of social science into the waging of the Cold War, of 
which the intersection of global health and cartography represents an important example, 
promotes a liberal modernism that could develop the world to both further American strategic 
interests and idealistically improve the lives of the great masses of the globe.   
 To advance these contributions, I will detail the rhetorical history by which medical 
geography came to fruition in postwar culture, from its origins during WWII as part of the US 
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program to increasingly know the world, and into May’s hands as a global archive for 
documenting sickness as a threat to international power and security. I will then engage in a 
visual analysis of the rhetorical features of some of the maps themselves, while tracing out the 
maps’ various appropriations in surrounding Cold War-era military, government, scientific, and 
popular contexts. The analysis recognizes three particular themes that emerge from this 
relationship between the AOD texts and their surrounding contexts: 1) the ability of AOD maps 
to draw distinct boundaries between “developed” and “developing” ideologies, 2) the ways in 
which the maps define disease as a cultural phenomenon and constrain a sense of Third World 
identity, and 3) the relationship of markets to medicine in May’s and the AGS’ discourse that 
links disease to the economics of Cold War development. Important at each of these stages is to 
keep the maps in conversation with archival documents from Jacques May’s collection in the 
American Geographical Society’s library at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Such 
documents suggest productive links between the finished and circulating maps with May’s own 
conceptions of his work and the contribution of medical geography to a fraught international 
landscape divided by binaries between East/West, and North/South. Overall, Jacques May’s 
maps remind us that modernization and its role in development discourses of the Cold War did 
not rest on a simple dichotomy of altruism and self-interest. Instead, the AOD upheld and 
circulated the Cold War ideological tenet that American’s own self-interests could be equated 
with the interests of the rest of the world. In this way, we can—and should—situate cartography 
as a complex rhetorical practice vital to the discourses of American power. 
The Rhetorical Construction of Third World Disease in the Early Cold War 
 
At even the earliest stages of the Cold War, the highest halls of American leadership were 
formulating a spatially-conscious global push to modernize the Third World.15 As a new 
corollary to the European Marshall Plan, President Harry S. Truman outlined what came to be 
known as the “Point Four Program” (so named because it was the fourth plank in his inaugural 
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address on January 20, 1949), which set out to bring “scientific advances and industrial progress” 
to the world’s underdeveloped areas.16 As Truman offered:  
More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their 
food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and 
stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous 
areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve 
the suffering of these people. The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the 
development of industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can 
afford to use for the assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable 
resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible.17 
Truman’s Point Four Program, which morphed into the State Department’s Technical 
Cooperation Administration, was concerned with an interventionism of ideas and knowledge 
production.18 Its establishment also demonstrated that from a point early in the Cold War, the 
stark East/West binaries were filled out and re-colored by the complex, multilayered South—of 
which the Atlas of Disease would no doubt become a part. 
Truman’s push for a program to spread US knowledge across the globe was linked with 
the rise of modernization theory, which became a major part of the collaboration between the US 
government and the social sciences in the Cold War. For example, “area studies” programs were 
a large collaborative focus between government/military interests and academic institutions, 
think-tanks, and commercial research foundations, designed to create massive interdisciplinary 
knowledge (especially in the social sciences) of particular regions—specifically as catalysts for 
development projects in strategic spaces.19 Out of collaborations like these came works such as 
Walt Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth, which was the Cold War hallmark “non-communist 
manifesto” for modernization.20 To respond to the Soviet’s own brand of modernization, social 
scientists like Rostow were looking for a logic and a lexicon that expressed US plans for the 
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increasingly Southern focus of the Cold War—the push to standardize technical knowledge of 
and for the spaces of US influence around the world became the answer.21  
Of course, this move toward abstract knowledge necessarily involved a denial of 
individual Third World nations’ pasts and differences.22 As Kimber Charles Pearce has 
concluded, theories like Rostow’s made development a progressive, linear process with an anti-
Communist pretext whose “argument that all nations pass naturally through the same phases of 
development convinced US policy makers to homogenize their methods of economic 
interventionism in the Third World, although that view of the evolution of liberal democratic 
capitalism tended to mask conflict and emphasize the continuities of the development process.”23 
Critical geographers like Simon Dalby have similarly characterized this argument as a Cold War 
narrative that reduced contentious political and social issues to technical considerations, ones 
that could be improved by better knowledge and instruments.24 In this way, Western elites could 
construct, according to Arturo Escobar, “a regime of truth through which the Third World is 
inevitably known, intervened on, and managed.”25 Developing nations thus quickly became 
defined in terms of their perceived deficits in capital, political viability, even health.26 In the 
process, as Westad says, “[t]he methods of the superpowers and of their local allies were 
remarkably similar to those honed during the last phase of European colonialism: giant social 
and economic projects, bringing promises of modernity” to their areas of influence.27 
The rhetorical construction of “disease” was one such prominent project of 
modernization. The label of disease itself is an important rhetorical choice, as used by Truman 
and the purveyors of the projects that began under his administration.28 According to Paul 
Chilton, in his investigation of early Cold War security discourse, “[s]tereotypically at least, the 
body is conceptualized as having an inside, an outside, and a surface boundary. . . . Diseases are 
typically imagined as invading the body from outside[.]”29 That early Cold War master trope of 
“containment,” then, could easily serve the emerging ideological practices of global three-world 
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partitioning through its distinctions between sick and healthy, and by extension, developing and 
developed. In Ostherr’s terms, medical, academic, and popular institutions in the postwar period   
are linked in their preoccupation with visuality, and, indeed, the “invisibility” attributed 
to the postwar invaders is belied by the omnipresent representations of unsanctioned 
national and bodily border crossings in this period. . . . [T]he imagined invaders 
announced their presence everywhere, across a wide range of audiovisual modes of 
representation and, crucially, through the discourse of world health.30  
Through such modes, for Ostherr, “bodily invasion is collapsed with geopolitical invasion, and 
both are treated as processes of contagion.”31 Mary Manjikian similarly emphasizes how the 
visual conflation of the diseased individual with the national “body politic” reinforced important 
hierarchies: “[i]n establishing one state as the default or normal state and the other as the deviant 
state, both types of discourse (medical and political) set up a power differential in which those in 
the normal state are both higher than and responsible for those in the deviant state.”32 Maps like 
those in the Atlas of Disease, therefore, reinforce this figuration by conflating abstract national 
bodies with afflicted human bodies, and by “containing” certain spaces through a kind of visual 
quarantine imposed by “healthy” states.  
Thus, the fear of the political spread of militancy in the new nations was accompanied, 
not coincidentally, by a fear of the spread of infectious disease. For Donna Haraway, the “residue 
of the history of colonial tropical medicine” continued to follow public discourse, even in this 
unprecedented era of national independence; in her words, “[e]xpansionist western medical 
discourse…involved a stunning reversal: the colonized was perceived as the invader. In the face 
of the disease genocides accompanying European ‘penetration’ of the globe, the ‘colored’ body 
of the colonized was constructed as the dark source of infection, pollution, disorder, etc. that 
threatened to overwhelm white manhood[.]”33 However, the difference now was that the 
purveyors of postwar quantitative science at institutions like the AGS could dispassionately use 
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world disease statistics to help advance economic development and modernization as a new kind 
of colonizing control under a more progressive “liberatory” narrative. Such a concept dovetails 
with what Ned O’Gorman has called “political-economic adventurism” in the development 
culture within the US government, wherein key leaders and bureaucrats saw that “with creative 
world political and economic action, the United States could restore its ideological hegemony 
over the free world and ‘expand the area of freedom.’”34 Failure to take bold, global actions 
would be seen not only as a strategic problem, but also an aesthetic one—in other words, to not 
seize the opportunity for the United States to perform on the world stage was a failure to uphold 
a particular image that was seen as necessary. An ambitious global project like the Atlas of 
Disease, then, was not simply a question of promoting scientific progress and knowledge-
building on a grand scale, but also an important aesthetic performance of what the United States 
had the capability of projecting. 
The Origins of the Atlas of Disease and the  
Role of Medical Cartography in US Rhetorics of Development 
 
Within these contexts, then, maps uniquely reflected new US roles in the developing 
world by shaping and constraining the very ways the developing world was becoming a Cold 
War space. Not coincidentally, the discipline of geography rose to prominence at this time as a 
more quantitative social science, which was particularly important as Third World nations 
decolonized in large numbers and information about them became rapidly available.35 Thematic 
maps, covering a rapidly expanding diversity of topics about social problems in far-flung areas 
of the world, circulated especially widely. And, yet, the political implications of these displays 
were often concealed because maps were still typically seen as technical, scientific documents 
that could survey the globe with objectivity.36  
 The specific project of medical geography arose first, though, around the concerns of 
contamination among World War II soldiers traversing all parts of the earth during their tours of 
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duty. The relationship of disease to physical location and region was not a new line of inquiry, of 
course: the writings of Hippocrates in On Airs, Waters, and Places established this connection.37 
But the systematic study of disease from a geographic point of view did not become prominent 
until the 19th century, when Prussian medical officers introduced the term “medical geography” 
and “sought to demonstrate a connection between the geographical location of disease and the 
prevailing physical, social, and cultural features of the surrounding environment.”38 In America, 
studies of disease (particularly alcoholism) and geography in the early frontier West appeared in 
public discourse, US census data was used to produce “Sanitary Maps” of preventable diseases 
in areas such as Louisiana and Texas, and some Civil War-era research related disease and race 
to geographic location.39  
Still, US efforts at an international program of study in medical geography and 
cartography did not really take place until the push toward globalism in the 1940s. Indeed, the 
Department of Medical Geography archive for the AGS teems with WWII-era news clippings 
affirming the new concerns about the internationalization of disease.40 The rise of the airplane, 
for example, was a frequent topic, with 1943 NY Herald-Tribune articles such as “World Health 
Vital With Plane as Germ ‘Carrier’,” including Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles 
pronouncing that “There are no more disruptive forces than starvation and pestilence.”41 A New 
York Times piece reported on a 1943 physicians conference, which featured prominent members 
of the American medical community drafting a resolution with the prescient pronouncement that 
“the post-war era will see another global war of gigantic dimensions against an invisible army of 
countless billions of disease carriers against which defense measures must be undertaken 
immediately.”42 From an early point, then, the discourses of disease, defense, and foreign policy 
intertwined and fused together. 
 The official AGS initiative began in 1944 with a conference convened by Dr. Richard 
Light and the directors of the AGS, endorsed by Isaiah Bowman, the prominent geographic 
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consultant for President Roosevelt (and early AGS president), and held in concert with Col. 
Gaylord Anderson, the head of the Division of Medical Intelligence for the United States 
Army.43 The conference, comprising geographers, medical scientists, military medical officers, 
and influential government public health officials, outlined the specifications for a 
comprehensive Atlas of Disease, with the agreement that “the atlas is to be designed primarily as 
a tool of research rather than as a textbook or for popular use. Certain parts of the atlas, however, 
might well be adapted to the practical needs of persons coping with the control of diseases under 
special conditions (e.g. those of air transport).”44 There was a sense at the conference, though, 
that the project could prove innovative and popular. As then-AGS president Roland Redmond 
noted, “We want the atlas to be a pathfinder, an instrument that will develop techniques…and yet 
one that ought to be sufficient in scope to show other people how valuable the type of 
information would be.”45  
The debate around the project’s political implications was also present at this early stage, 
which was seemingly resolved by an institutional commitment to a rhetoric of scientific 
objectivity, fitting to the early Cold War era. The Rockefeller Foundation’s W.A. Sawyer, for 
example, expressed at the conference that “I think you can give any facts that are essential to our 
epidemiological argument or available for epidemiological use without offense as long as the 
person who writes the description does not make invidious comparisons favoring his own 
country.”46 The question of ethnicity and culture in mapping disease was subordinated and 
disciplined in service of the so-called scientific message. The notion of “self-evidence” was 
inextricable, then, from cartographic visualizations, in that the appearance of a network of “facts” 
on a spatial grid assumes the appearance of commonsense, universal knowledge. In fact, much of 
the early discourse within the AGS around the Atlas of Disease cautiously debated how to 
sufficiently control audience interpretation of the maps in order to maximize and promote such 
common sense and knowledge production. 
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 Still, despite its founders’ emphasis on scientific utility, the economic foundation of the 
Department of Medical Geography at the AGS, and its flagship Atlas of Disease project, was 
based in the contributions of two institutions: the US government (originally through the Office 
of Naval Research and later through the Army’s Office of the Surgeon General) and the 
pharmaceutical industry (first through a grant from Upjohn and later through connections to 
firms like Pfizer and Lilly). Right from the start, then, the AOD’s cartographic discourse on 
disease was integrated into both the discourses of international capital development and national 
security. AGS’ grant application to the Navy, for example, stated the purposes clearly, noting 
that “the development of backward areas on which so much depends, economically and 
politically, is conditioned by the study of man against the land which he is to develop,” while at 
the same time, “we have to sum up our knowledge of the distribution of diseases, existing or 
potential, throughout the world to protect our men who may be called upon to establish 
themselves in any of the infected areas.”47 For example, one of May’s major projects in a later 
edition of the Atlas of Disease was mapping the various forms of viral encephalitis, particularly 
in response to the hemorrhagic encephalitis epidemic that ravaged US troops in the Korean 
War.48 At the same time, the maps would later be sent to firms like Pfizer, intended to be 
included with literature that would be sent out to medical professionals (and Pfizer clients) and to 
help provide data on diseases that were specifically treatable by Pfizer medicines.49 In this way, 
the Atlas of Disease maps proved a fluid, often dual-voiced set of discourses that held various 
political and economic interests in tension with one another. 
The founding committee waited until the end of the war to get the Atlas off the ground, 
and it wasn’t until 1948 that it decided on Jacques May as its first official director.50 May was a 
prized find for being a truly internationally-experienced physician with his renowned work in 
colonial-era Hanoi. While May’s background and credentials gave the project an international 
flair, the Atlas was clear about its chiefly American concerns about security and economic 
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modernization, with altruism as a desirable, but not always necessary, byproduct. In a 1954 
report to the Council on Foreign Relations for example, May noted that, “No ethical 
considerations have their place here. The problem is to discover how a condition which is 
detrimental to the well-being of the United States can be remedied. It is hoped that the solution 
found will be profitable also to the populations and to the territories to which it will be 
applied.”51 Here, the strategic realism of the Atlas of Disease project comes to the forefront, and 
rests uneasily alongside the initiative’s liberal ideology of modernization. The protection of US 
interests is made paramount, with the hope (but not guarantee) that indigenous “benefactors” of 
American development would see those interests as commensurate with their own. 
This uneasy tension is addressed by historical geographers Tim Brown and Graham 
Moon, who use May’s background as a physician during Indochina’s last vestiges of colonialism 
to show his approach to medical geography as a benevolent, triumphalist spin on an “imperial 
history that views the unfolding of events from the perspective of the dominant culture.”52 At the 
same time, though, this brand of imperialism was marked by a more “rational, scientific view of 
disease causality.”53 At a conference in 1954, May himself reflected on the striking similarities to 
his previous work in a colonial outpost with the more global aspirations of the Atlas of Disease, 
offering that in Indochina, 
We were confronted with the same problems. We had the tools of the colonial system at 
our disposal but we wanted to improve on what we had brought about hitherto. We knew 
that too much technology would create unemployment in the Red River Delta. What this 
group wants to do now is similar to what the colonial powers tried to do in their empires: 
namely, capital investment, technological guidance, and presumably protection of the 
funds and the experts. We want to do it now without the tools of the colonial system.54 
Certainly, this shift out of colonialism toward capital development and technocratic expertise 
paralleled the evolution of cartography in the postwar era toward a more scientific, quantitative 
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foundation. In the process, American elites could increasingly use maps as strategic instruments 
to assess truly global problems. 
The Civilizational Borders in the Cartographic Style of the Atlas of Disease 
This fraught colonial lineage also leads to the first of the AOD’s major rhetorical 
implications: the ways in which the maps visually instantiate the contrast between the developed 
or “civilized” and the developing world, and thus complicate the relationship between both 
East/West and North/South. A 1950 article in AGS’ flagship journal The Geographical Review, 
written by May, serves as a kind of introductory manifesto for the entire AOD initiative, as the 
text explicitly links the map to the conception of development in stark civilizational terms that 
the highest halls of executive leadership had outlined months before: 
The President of the United States has declared his intention to lead the country into a 
new program for the advancement of backward areas of the world. When the time comes 
to enforce this policy, there will be a demand for facts about these backward areas. The 
question will be asked, what makes people backward? What causes countries to be 
underdeveloped?.... [Tropical populations] cannot develop their intelligence and culture, 
cannot organize agriculture profitably or develop commerce and industry or the arts of 
social living. They are, consequently, in no position to establish institutions by which 
they could raise their standard of living, organize sanitary campaigns, and achieve public 
health. Since they cannot get rid of their most despotic tyrants and oppressors, the 
intestinal worms and blood parasites, they are tied down by their physical condition to 
their backward status. Medical geography could become a preliminary step to the 
redemption of backward countries throughout the world; for, in our final definition, it is 
the systematic study of the correlations that exist between the diseases of the land and the 
diseases of the people.55 
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No less than a moral appeal to “redemption” is made by May here—a way into modernity for the 
peoples below the equator. And in a speech given later that year to the American Public Health 
Association about the polio map, May spoke directly to why maps were chosen as the medium to 
represent such redemption:  
The representation of results of public health investigations can be made in different 
ways, of which cartographic methods are, perhaps, the most effective. There are several 
reasons for this. A map has a visual appeal that charts and diagrams do not have to the 
same degree. It establishes immediate correlation between the occurrence of the 
phenomena and the terrain, and it can go as far as one wishes in the description of 
environmental correlations.56  
This is perhaps one of May’s clearest expressions of the rhetorical power of cartography: the 
immediacy and simultaneity of having layers of information available in one glance for the 
suggestive power of mapping global relationships. 
The actual Atlas of Disease was officially inaugurated with the publication and 
distribution of the “Map of the World Distribution of Poliomyelitis” in the Geographical Review 
at the end of 1950.57 The polio map also established some of the features of the distinct 
cartographic style of the Atlas of Disease: beautiful color plates covering a wide swathe of time 
(1900-1950) in the rises and falls of polio over the world’s seven major regions. However, it was 
not until the second map of the series, “The Distribution of Cholera 1816-1950” (Figure 1) from 
1951, that the Atlas of Disease landed on the cartographic formula that would sustain its 
innovation and circulatory success.58 While the polio map had seven different insets of the world 
regions, “Cholera” invites the viewer into an odd, egg-shaped full-world view, connecting the 
various areas of the globe with colorful lines indicating the historical routes of major pandemics. 
The marginalia of the cholera map includes a host of smaller maps, some of specific regions such 
as Egypt, India, and Southeast Asia, others of the entire world showing the changes in where 
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cholera has moved over the preceding two centuries. Before looking at each inset and box, the 
effect is one of awe at the overwhelming cornucopia of disease data and expertise on display; 
knowledge itself is in some respects the main subject of the map, and the general presentation 
connotes the authority of scientific investigation.  
 
   Figure 1: American Geographical Society, “Distribution of Cholera, 1816-1950,” 1951 (From the American 
Geographical Society Library, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Libraries). 
 
The various pieces synthesized into the map also work to collapse time and space and 
create a notion of progression. The story of cholera in this map is one in which the Northern 
areas have largely purged themselves of the disease, and cholera now exclusively infects the 
subequatorial areas. Right beneath the centered, main world map, for example, is a large inset 
with the title “The Permanence of Cholera,” which focuses on Southern Asia and a blood-red 
India (the intensity of color matching the intensity of disease). Color and density are, obviously, 
common tools for cartographers—and here the rhetorical choice of red and pink hues offer a 
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sense of urgency, alarm, and infection.59 The presentation of progression in the map supports the 
seemingly “self-evident” ideology of an almost natural division between the so-called North and 
South. The disease has somehow been conquered by the developed world and now inflicts those 
areas that are in the perpetual process of “becoming.” The overall effect of these displays is the 
empowerment of America’s medical expertise. Cartography’s historical power of linking entire 
territories with particular traits and relating them in total to other territories with those same 
traits is especially powerful when the subject is sickness.60 The map’s ability to partition world 
spaces creates a quarantine effect, seeking to isolate these problem areas. 
 The egg-shaped innovation of the Briesemeister projection, seen in the center of the 
cholera map, was in large part responsible for this suggestive framing of the Atlas of Disease and 
its ideological representation of the world.61 May’s maps were drawn by the American 
Geographical Society’s senior cartographer, William Briesemeister, who invented a special 
projection specifically for the Disease maps.62 The Briesemeister projection was a notably 
prominent representation of the increasingly popular use of equal-area on world maps in the 
postwar era, and one especially well-matched to the complications of a Cold War. Briesemeister 
himself billed it as the “most suitable equal-area projection for the purpose of plotting world 
wide statistics in this present day of super speed, jet planes and intercontinental missiles.”63 
Equal-area maps essentially sacrificed recognizable shape for a greater accuracy in terms of 
world area, and this trade-off is clearly seen in the AOD maps. The Briesemeister projection uses 
an odd and compelling elliptical shape, and in the top center of the map, the entire North Pole 
can be seen, with Alaska and the Bering Strait region of the Soviet Union forming the northern-
most point. Importantly, except for Antarctica, the continents are grouped without being cut; thus, 
the map has a fluidity and “one-world” quality.64 Most striking is the prominence of Africa and 
South America, and the two continents’ large area in comparison to North America, Europe, and 
the Soviet Union.  
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Using the Briesemeister projection, Atlas of Disease maps like “Distribution of 
Helminthiases” make particularly prominent use of Africa as the focal point, where the 
comparatively few other instances of this parasitical disease stand in contrast to the deep colors 
and thick, bold crisscrossed lines plaguing the African landscape.65 Africa’s visualization as the 
least distorted of all continents in Briesemeister’s projection creates the impression that Africa is 
a sick continent, as the landmass sits centered and accentuated in the visual field of the map. The 
eye lands squarely on Africa in Briesemeister’s presentation, and the concentration of disease, 
thus, appears self-evident. For Cold War space, the new focus on comprehensive, global 
knowledge called for maps that lent themselves well to statistical distribution. While shapes may 
have been slightly distorted, cartographers and policymakers placed a higher premium on 
accuracy in area to pinpoint zones for economic and social development in emerging nations. In 
a decolonizing world, for example, a shift away from the perceived areal inaccuracies of colonial 
remnants like the Mercator was seen as important to scientific postwar cartographers sensitive to 
portraying what they saw as a more “objective” world. In an early 1951 AGS press release, May 
spoke to such benefits when he referred to how, on the Briesemeister projection, “the whole 
world is shown in a frontal view without any of the distortions which make other projections 
misleading.”66 Even small innovations like the Briesemeister show an increasing visual 
acceptance of North/South as a defining characteristic of world relationships in terms of bringing 
politics, the military, and academic social science together. 
Two particularly provocative companion maps in the AOD series, the two studies on 
“Human Starvation,” make especially noteworthy use of the kinds of heightened North/South 
contrasts that the Briesemeister draws upon. The first map, in fact, is unlike any of the maps in 
the series in that it shows no disease, affliction, or geographic obstacle; this map, conversely, 
shows abundance and opportunity in its depiction of all of the availability and plentiful sources 
of food across the world. The main centered Briesemeister map presents a world of animal 
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proteins, while two Briesemeister projections of equal size below show available cereal 
carbohydrates and tubers, vegetables etc. The muted, earthy colors connote a world where 
natural resources abound in all continents and areas.  
However, this map only gains its full meaning through its relationship with its companion 
map, “Study of Human Starvation II,” (Figure 2) which grossly contrasts this abundance with a 
study of nutritional-deficiency diseases and diet and vitamin problems in many of the same areas 
in which the first map showed arable land. Conspicuously, this map of starvation uses sharper 
and darker shades of deep purple, black, blue, and an almost neon pink—a marked contrast from 
the organic tones of the first map. The bright colors are noticeably dotted around a deficient 
“South” in the second map. In a draft of some explanatory text for the maps, May asks “Whence 
the starvation and illness? This can chiefly be explained by faulty distribution among the various 
groups of population of food theoretically available,” with distribution as the central factor for 
“this picture of distress, scarcity, and misery as it contrasts with our previous show of plenty.”67 
The heightened contrast of the two maps in availability and scarcity streamlines the difficulties 
and struggles of particular populations to access such “theoretically available” food, and 
potentially reduces such struggles to a simple have and have-not dichotomy, once again in 
civilizational terms. I.M. Young has offered a warning against a focus on “distribution” as the 
impetus for social justice, as such a paradigm “tends to ignore the social structure and 
institutional context that often help determine distributive patterns.”68 And here, the sense of 
either colonial or Cold War institutional constraints on the patterns of distribution go missing 
from the lines of the map. 
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Figure 2: American Geographical Society, “Study in Human Starvation 2,” 1953 (From the American 
Geographical Society Library, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Libraries). 
 
The studies of human starvation, in fact, reinforce new Cold War exigencies by 
integrating the so-called “Second World” into the stark First and Third World comparisons. One 
of the most compelling visual features of the “Diets” inset on the second “Starvation” map shows 
the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites covered mostly in blue (at least the parts of 
the USSR that had available information), which indicates areas that have “adequate” diets (the 
same color that covers the United States and Western Europe). However, a rash of almost sickly 
pink dots cover the Central and Eastern landscape of Russia and bleed into Eastern Europe, with 
pink indicating those areas where diets are most deficient. While the map doesn’t necessarily 
explain why this area is covered in dots, the research files for the map reveal correspondence 
between May and the Free Trade Union Committee of the American Federation of Labor, which 
had recently published an internationally-circulating map of all of the reported Gulag prison 
camps in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, a controversial map that was considered by some 
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to be “one of the most widely circulated piece of anti-Communist literature” in the Cold War.69 
In May’s letter to the AFL, he requests to “use the material shown on this map as a contrast with 
official figures that indicate a satisfactory status of nutrition in Russia.”70 The rash of dots in the 
Atlas of Disease “Starvation” map thus indicates the placement of labor camps in the Soviet 
Union as sites not only of starvation and disease, but as a politicized challenge to the communist 
production of knowledge in the Cold War.71 May’s appropriation of such data is an instantiation 
of a division between the West and the East for ideological purposes, implying that the Third 
World is left at the hands of a “free” or “unfree” patron in the United States or Soviet Union.  
Relatedly, a conspicuous contrast in the two starvation maps revolves around Communist 
China: in the first map, China is presented as one of the most fertile in terms of its abundance of 
foods and nutritional opportunities. The second map, however, bathes China in the blacks and 
pinks that indicate serious levels of protein and mineral deficiencies, and a small note in a side 
paragraph on the map marks the effects of the central planning of the 1949 Communist 
Revolution on the Chinese countryside. It is no wonder that soon after the AOD starvation maps 
were produced, the Voice of America station translated a story on the maps into Chinese for 
broadcast in the Far East, making explicit use of public health and development as a Cold War 
weapon.72 Thus, the Atlas of Disease is not only situated as constraining East/West relationships 
with North/South ones, but the project also shows the political collaboration of academic 
societies, government propaganda organizations, and even labor unions in the production of Cold 
War discourse. 
The Cultural Identity Politics of the Atlas of Disease 
While the Atlas of Disease showcased an innovative visual style, May’s work was even 
more noted for its emphasis on the cultural aspects of disease, particularly how “pathogens” like 
cholera and malaria are related to “geogens” such as religion, eating practices, marriage practices 
etc.73 The 1954 Newsweek profile of May highlighted the ability of the AOD disease maps to 
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make connections between disease and “soil, air, water, foodstuffs, modes of living, and 
religious customs and habits that contribute to these ailments.”74 The specific examples used in 
the article establish direct connections between sickness and religious beliefs: “The daily 
ablutions of Moslem rites are usually performed in polluted water, causing infection. The 
common bowls for washing the hands in Buddhist temples are a prime source of eye and skin 
diseases. In Asia, pilgrims are frequently the carriers of cholera and plague.”75 And, for example, 
in the aforementioned starvation maps, May’s accompanying text bears out how seemingly 
“backward” habits have a ripple effect on Third World societies, as he writes that  
The social structure of the society, chiefly exemplified in Egypt and China, is a serious 
cause of food shortage. In some places the customs governing inheritance divide the land 
to such a degree that it can no longer be worked profitably. Yet the people refuse to 
migrate because they have heard frightening tales about the places where they could 
migrate, or because there are no such places within their reach, or because they cannot 
afford transportation, or because they are bound by religious belief to stay near the place 
where their ancestors are buried.76  
Indeed, in historian of medicine Felix Marti-Ibanez’s 1958 introduction to May’s AGS-
sponsored book, The Ecology of Human Disease, culture is emphasized as a constraining factor: 
“culture could influence disease by uniting or separating, whichever the case may be, the 
‘challenges’ of the environment, which would then change and so would the host population” 
with the solution being to “change the disease-producing environment in which man lives.”77 
The AOD evidenced that one integral way to change “cultures” is through the accumulation of 
scientific knowledge on a global scale.  
The focus on culture in May’s work is telling because it parallels the Cold War 
discourses around foreign aid and development, as seen in Truman’s Point Four initiatives, 
which often assume essential identities in the so-called developing peoples. As international 
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relations scholar Roxanne Doty notes, these foreign aid discourses “suggest that the danger was 
not in poverty itself, but in the identities of those who were impoverished, those who could not 
take a long-range view of their situations.”78 Similarly, in combating world health issues, 
sickness would be equated not only with particular world regions, but with the people who filled 
those regions. Cartography provided the means by which to visually edify these dangers—the 
way by which the “long-range view” could be taken. In other words, this approach implied not so 
much that the diseased are dangerous, but more that they are behind in terms of development, 
and that is dangerous. 
This connection of the AOD to Third World identity-construction is evidenced in one of 
the most striking maps in the collection: the 1955 “World Distribution of Spirochetal Diseases: 
Yaws, Pinta, and Bejel” (Figure 3).79 Unlike any of the other maps in the Atlas, “Yaws, Pinta, 
and Bejel” integrates photographic evidence of these diseases directly into the cartographic 
display. Above the AOD’s trademark Briesemeister projection, which in this instance displays 
through various color shades the intensity of infection rates, are four photographs: one shows 
what appears to be a young, naked child of African descent covered in lesions, a close-up of a 
brown arm disembodied from its human source and revealing the severe tissue erosion of Pinta, 
the revelation of an exposed backside of a black body spotted by lesions, and what appears to be 
the bottom of a child’s foot disturbingly infected, raw, and scarred away by disease. The 
photographs are placed and centered prominently over the Northern hemisphere, reflecting 
May’s and his cartographers’ assumptions that there is no relevant information on these diseases 
in these areas. The telling placement of the photos speaks to a confidence that readers and users 
of the map would not be looking for incidences of these afflictions in the so-called North. 
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Figure 3: American Geographical Society, “World Distribution of Spirochetal Diseases: 1. Yaws, Pinta, Bejel,” 
1955 (From the American Geographical Society Library, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Libraries). 
 
The overall effect of the photographs, on one hand, is clinical, tantamount to a lab 
specimen being objectively documented for the purposes of epidemiology. On the other hand, an 
unmistakable (and uncomfortable) voyeurism is ingrained into the display. While the other maps 
of the AOD dutifully conceal the visuality of infection, this map frames the bodies at an 
uncomfortably close distance and dramatizes them for what is likely a typically white and male 
gaze. The archive for the Yaws, Pinta, and Bejel map project, for example, also contains a folder 
stuffed with more horrifically detailed photographs of black bodies in various states of decay.80 
The bodies, in a sense, are made anonymous and universal by the photographs, and become 
fetishized as tokens of disease, and by extension, as markers of underdevelopment. What was 
once the paternalism of colonial power is now transferred into the “liberation” ideology of 
American modernization and development—paternalism of a different kind. And perhaps most 
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importantly, these photographs are in no way detachable from the map; the photographs work in 
tandem with the spatial ordering of May’s cartography. The visceral, concrete images collaborate 
intertextually with the abstract spaces of the map to connote difference, as both blackness and 
sickness are “placed” simultaneously onto the Cold War grid. In Haraway’s terms, “the body is 
conceived as a strategic system, highly militarized in key arenas of imagery and practice. . . . 
[T]he body ceases to be a stable spatial map of normalized functions and instead emerges as a 
highly mobile field of strategic differences.”81 Within this field of differences, “[t]he marked 
organic body has been a critical locus of cultural and political contestation, crucial both to the 
languages of liberatory politics of identity and to systems of domination drawing on widely 
shared languages of nature constructed as resource for the appropriations of culture.”82 In this 
way, the Atlas of Disease, through maps like “Yaws, Pinta, and Bejel,” can be seen as both a 
benevolent and problematic visual projection of the fine line between Cold War liberation and 
domination, and its attendant identity politics. 
While the photography of the “Yaws, Pinta, and Bejel” map reinforces a narrative of 
cultural difference as natural, the fact that only one of the maps chooses to focus on bodies 
reminds the viewer that the AOD narrative is also one of cleanliness and concealment. The other 
sixteen maps’ lack of engagement with the human face of disease makes the contrast with the 
photography of “Yaws, Pinta, and Bejel” that much more stark. In the process, this contrast 
situates the AOD’s cartography as the ultimate “rhetoric of sanitization,” wherein the immensely 
complex world of transnational disease, replete with sick and ravaged human bodies, can be 
cleansed and ordered into abstract visual fields, contained by clean lines, diagrams, and 
continental borders. The elite expertise of medical professionals and geographers, in this case, 
chooses the dynamics of revelation and concealment, thus exerting power over “Third World” 
bodies and their markers of identity. 
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What the AOD project also establishes, then, is that the performance and rhetorical 
display of expertise was a central function of disease mapping. For example, unlike previous 
national studies of geography and disease in different countries, May’s methods were based on 
collection and synthesis, without the money or infrastructure to be able to conduct field work. 
What May and his team did (borne out in the archives by piles of returned surveys from health 
departments across the world) was rely on the expertise of doctors and public health 
professionals all over the world, some natives of the areas and some transplanted, to interpret 
local and national data and submit them to the interpretation of the AGS.83 In an important sense, 
these methods matched the increasing detachment and distance of scientific study in the postwar 
era: the disappearance of the analytical field researcher and the rise of the master synthesizer of 
complex data. The finished maps, then, were patchworks of international collaborations and 
regimes of interpretation. The ordered and streamlined visual field concealed tensions around 
power and distance, while simultaneously revealing the premium on scientific expertise in the 
early Cold War. In David Campbell’s words, this kind of dynamic “establishes a power 
relationship in which the authority making the diagnosis occupies the position of a doctor vis-à-
vis the patient, thereby reproducing the notion that the health (or security) of the larger 
population is dependent on the specialized knowledge of an elite.”84 In this way, the AOD 
positioned May and his team to serve as the doctor diagnosing the world body, with the maps 
reinforcing May’s (Western) medical expertise and his ability to interpret global sickness. 
Of Medicine and Markets: The Worth of “Data” in the Atlas of Disease 
 Much has been said here on the interests of the academic, government, and defense 
communities in the role of modernization and development during the Cold War. The AOD 
project, however, also highlights how American private industry projected itself onto the world 
map. In the era of postwar development, the idea of capital was spatialized on a global scale at 
the same time that disease and starvation were. Thus, it is no surprise that US medicine and 
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markets aided each other’s growth in this period. The Atlas of Disease, thus, serves as a 
representative project in which such interests found the blight of Third World populations to be 
an opportunity for both material and ideological expansion. 
By the height of the AOD’s activity in 1952 and 1953, May and the AGS were receiving 
a surplus of correspondence and inquiries from drug companies: Lederle Laboratories 
(eventually Wyeth) requested copies of the starvation maps, while Pfizer was granted permission 
to create a bound set of the maps as Christmas presents for their physician clients.85 As the 
project grew in scope, the amassed data began to be seen as especially valuable to these 
companies and others. For one, the Atlas of Disease was used frequently by the influential 
Council on Foreign Relations, whose mission was to serve as a non-partisan organization 
committed to influencing the public and the executive branch on foreign policy.86 At the same 
time, the Council also self-identified as “the ideal catalytic agency to bring together the 
government, international agency, business, foundation, and university or other research groups 
here and abroad.”87 At a 1954 conference of the CFR on Climates and Economic Development in 
the Tropics, the AGS distributed AOD maps to each of the participants, which included public 
health professionals, academic social scientists, and notably, executives from corporations such 
as Standard Oil and United Fruit Company.88 At the conference, May’s presentation reflected the 
Cold War implications of capital development, once again, in civilizational terms, as he noted 
that “it is significant that the ‘revolution of expectations’ that has taken place in many countries 
is usually stated in terms of the values and material goods of [American] civilization. US 
government policy must take this into account because, if we fail to give them what they want, 
someone else will.”89 May was arguing that one of the main “cures” for the sicknesses dotting 
his maps was an infusion of American cash and ideas, taking a concrete problem of ailing bodies 
and answering it with the principles of marketing and the promotion of American values. May, in 
a sense, then, was accentuating cartography’s ability to abstract real experiences on the ground. 
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In a related application of the Atlas of Disease, Jacques May was corresponding around 
the same time with chemist Erwin Di Cyan on a consulting project technically outside of May’s 
capacity as Director of AGS’ Medical Geography Department. Di Cyan proposed that, using 
May’s expertise on medicine and geography, the two could create an “International Survey for 
Pharmaceutical Development” in which they would charge corporations for advice on where a 
particular drug company’s products might be best marketed.90 In a 1955 letter of solicitation 
from Di Cyan to the Schering Corporation (which would later merge into Merck & Co.), the 
chemist notes that “personal consultation or correspondence may well specifically ‘pinpoint’ a 
firm’s product for a market. Either or both Dr. May or I are available for that purpose. . . . The 
special ISPD reports which are to be requested by a firm whose interest may reside in a given 
area or a given therapy are tailor made to fit the specific need of the firm.”91 The Mead Johnson 
corporation became May and Di Cyan’s first client, and the Lilly Co. also signed on, particularly 
to help with the pharmaceutical company’s planned expansion into Argentina.92 
In a set of letters between Di Cyan and May, Di Cyan encouraged May to do a special 
study on the viability of Vietnam for the pharmaceutical industry. May demurred by saying that, 
“I am not too hot about the diseases of Vietnam because the whole country is going to be 
gobbled up by the Communists before 1956 is over and there won’t be any markets left. 
Otherwise it would be one of my favorite subjects, as I could almost write the article in my 
sleep.”93 The ensuing response by Di Cyan further encourages May to write about Vietnam, and 
is worth quoting at length, as it offers a candid reflection on the ways in which markets, culture, 
and medicine are bound up in rhetorical tensions between North and South: 
You can touch upon the ethnic phase, the superstitions, the customs of the people, which 
will be valuable. . . . It is not impossible that some firms would wish to venture as a trial 
into a country which, if they make an error they will not vitiate a good potential 
market. . . . they may want to use the country as a “trial dog” as long as it lasts. . . . I do 
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expect, with your help, to be able to give such data as size of packages sold in India, 
where as you know, the coolie who makes 3 rupees daily will spend 2 annas for a dose of 
two tablets, and he will do so twice a day if necessary, but he will not buy a larger 
quantity. The reason is economic indeed, but also is rooted in superstitions as the 
purchase of large quantities of drugs is believed to presage a long illness. The coolie 
wants to fool the spirits. . . . Actually, pharmacology is not entirely divorced from 
ethnology and the ethnic religious and superstitious prejudices, of the “backward” people. 
But, isn’t it presumptuous of me to tell you those things, you who can teach me?94 
Di Cyan’s offhand remarks about the connection between pharmaceutical goods, profits, and 
ethnicity reflect the residues of colonization that carried forward into the decolonized Cold War 
landscape. Di Cyan’s telling scare quotes around “backward” suggest an implicit admission that 
he knows such a term is inappropriate. His self-identified status as a progressive scientist allows 
him a sense of detachment from the fading colonial divisions between civilizer and uncivilized. 
At the same time, it is arguably the very objectivity and sophistication of postwar science that 
allows Di Cyan to callously label all of Vietnam as a “trial dog,” a label that in an important 
sense reproduces those old colonial definitions. Such a quote, then, speaks to the complexities of 
self-interest and altruism in the establishment of American power. Men like May and Di Cyan 
would hardly identify as “colonizers,” but in their acceptance of Third World spaces as testing 
grounds for both medicine and capital, they subtly engage in a new recolonization. 
Overall, these revelations about the corporate connections in the AOD project are not 
presented here as a kind of “smoking gun,” or necessarily as damning evidence about the 
paternalistic and often racist discourses underlying the rhetoric of development, although they 
can certainly be read that way. And May’s relationships with pharmaceutical corporations do not 
necessarily demonstrate a conflict of interest with his scientific work for the AGS. On the 
contrary, these relationships acknowledge that markets, medicine, and national security are all 
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part of the same ideology of progress in the Cold War. In May’s vision, to improve the world 
according to modern definitions of development is not only strategically sound, but morally 
correct as well. The choice to treat sick bodies as no different than selling a consumer product is 
reconciled through the rhetoric of development that was at the heart of a project like the Atlas of 
Disease. For example, at a speech to the Triple E Club in 1955 called appropriately “American 
Stake in Foreign Diseases,” May reconciled the profit-making aspect of medical-geographic data 
with its humanitarian side: “No doubt, legitimate financial profit is part of the picture I propose 
to sketch out, but still more important are the returns that can be expected in the form of good 
will, relief of human misery, and political security.”95 At the same time, May recognized the 
value of communication in the fostering of development in Third World nations, as he noted that,  
We are quite convinced of the superiority of our science, technology, and methods of 
education, which is justifiable, but frequently we do not bother to devise means for 
reaching the people of these underdeveloped countries and to persuade them of our 
superiority in a way they can understand. Like our foreign aid, our good products reach a 
few but seldom trickle down to the mass of people in a country.96  
Thus, May emphasized the need to adapt the message to the culture of afflicted populations in 
order for the material benefits of American industry to also become part of the receiving 
population’s values.  
What becomes important to remember, however, is that the agency of the peoples living 
in these now self-determining nations is still noticeably absent from both the maps and the 
accompanying discourse by May and the AGS.97 The audience for the Atlas of Disease is never 
seriously constituted as native policymakers or doctors, much less the afflicted who live in the 
diseased regions marked on the maps, at least not directly. Rather, the AOD maps present the 
immense scope of a Third World problem that requires planning and large-scale attention by 
Western elites. Thus, those absences are essentially filled in by the voices of American experts. 
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In the end, this collaboration of medicine and markets could serve the ideology of modernization 
that conflated America’s interests with those of the rest of the world. And a map’s inherent 
ability to synthesize abstract ideas made it the right form for framing these discourses together. 
 
The Rhetorical Legacy of the Atlas of Disease 
 
The ensuing appropriation and adaptation of the Atlas of Disease reveals that the US 
government’s interest in this global mapping project was inseparable from its interests in world 
economic development. The Mutual Security Act of 1958, originally enacted in 1948, set forth a 
new policy plank stating:  
The Congress of the United States, recognizing that the diseases of mankind, because of 
their widespread prevalence, debilitating effects, and heavy toll in human life, constitute 
a major deterrent to the efforts of many peoples to develop their economic resources and 
productive capacities, and to improve their living conditions, declares it to be the policy 
of the United States to continue and strengthen mutual efforts among the nations for 
research against diseases[.]98 
To supplement this policy, in 1959 the Committee on Government Operations in the Senate, 
headed by Senator Hubert Humphrey, produced a report called The Status of World Health, 
which included more than 30 maps and charts, most of which were adapted versions of the 
AGS’s Atlas of Disease. Humphrey’s introduction to the report makes special reference to the 
need for a “big picture” approach to medicine “rather than piecemeal views of world health, such 
as may have been seen in times past” and “requires a total, not a segmented view,” as “U.S. 
responsibilities under world health programs continue to mount.”99  
Maps, appropriately, served as the main instruments of vision for Humphrey’s proposed 
big-picture approach. Using world regions as the basis of study, world maps of issues such as life 
expectancy at birth and the ratio of population to physicians sketched the stark contours of an 
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unequal world.100 These adaptations of the AGS maps are made much simpler than their 
referents. The layers of colors and shades that distinguished the AOD maps are replaced by the 
simple black, white, and gray dots of the typical Congressional report. A black area on the 
landscape fills in the lines of an entire nation, and in this way the diseases stand in for the regions 
on these maps (India equals smallpox, Egypt equals low life expectancy).101 The Status of World 
Health also foregoes the innovative, Third World–centric projections like the Briesemeister 
projection for the more conventional Mercator projection. With the audience for this report 
limited to other US lawmakers and health officials, the maps eschewed statistical depth and 
innovation in favor of a more East/West bipolar superpower perspective. Thus, The Status of 
World Health situates world health from the viewpoint of American security interests, and 
showcases that the ability to map world health is only as good as the availability of data. As 
Humphrey points out, the report’s main conclusion is that “more statistics are needed. . . . 
Regrettably, an analysis of the world health situation is difficult due to the lack of accurate, 
current statistical data, particularly from the less developed countries.”102 Instead of specific 
conclusions as to what can be done to improve world health, the implied argument is that the 
“full and accurate” documentation of world health is enough, that knowledge of these problems 
is the real goal—a goal that the rhetoric of the Atlas of Disease began fulfilling in earnest a 
decade before.  
By the end of the 1950s, the AGS was unable to sustain funding for its Medical 
Geography program, and the final two AOD maps, interestingly about world incidences of cancer 
and drug addiction, were never produced. May found some notable success moving his 
increasingly complex analyses of the “ecology” of diseases into the realm of the book-length 
work, away from the kind of one-glance mapping that synthesized his medical/geographic data 
together. By the time the AGS officially dissolved the program in 1961, the AGS directors were 
already forwarding correspondence and final letters to May in his new residence in Saigon, 
 35
having recently been appointed as the Chief Medical Education Adviser to the US Operations 
Mission in Vietnam. For Jacques May, a career that began in Vietnam had now come full-circle, 
except that the entire map of the world had dramatically changed by the time he joined the 
fateful mission in Southeast Asia. By the time May was advising the United States Armed Forces 
on how it could safely fight disease, the nation’s soldiers were fighting for their lives in a conflict 
already thick with the implications of the discourse of decolonization and development. There is 
a certain irony, of course, that the Atlas of Disease was defunded just as Hubert Humphrey was 
calling for more data on Third World disease in Congress. It may have been that the work of the 
independent AGS on world disease was seen as a task better suited to the capabilities of defense 
agencies, at a time when US management of Third World data became more militarized. In that 
way, May’s conscription into full-time military consulting may have been more than coincidental.  
Either way, it is safe to say that the kinds of visual definitions perpetuated by the Atlas of 
Disease were absorbed into the ideologies behind the continually escalating involvement in areas 
such as Vietnam. The AOD’s “rhetorical life” was inextricable from the post-WWII global 
spatialization of capital and the expansion of interventionist foreign policy in the Cold War. The 
twin discourses of modernization and development were practices that required forms of visual 
articulation to justify and synthesize such economic and political policies. In this case, 
cartography proved able to draw world spaces as abstract containers, and with lines that can draw 
the “over” and “under” distinctions and differences in identity that are needed to advance 
arguments of development. In that way, disease was not the enemy. It was the lack of knowledge 
about such diseases in foreign areas that became the enemy. Felix Marti-Ibanez’s introduction to 
May’s 1958 book, comprising much of his Atlas of Disease work, comments on the perceived 
value of medical cartography as a tool of development and knowledge production:  
Every human race, however, just like every human being, carries within its primitive soul 
an image of the ideal, which it endeavors to fit within the surrounding geographic 
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environment…Man throughout the centuries has fought against hunger, war, and disease, 
the three great threats that incessantly tend to change the map of humanity, just as 
medicine tends to shrink the empire of disease.103 
Ibanez fittingly sums up here the crucial implications of the Atlas of Disease, specifically, and 
the discursive work of medical geography as a whole in this era. The formerly colonized 
landscapes were being re-colonized by the liberal modernization of development. There was an 
“empire of disease” to be liberated, but its absence would require a different type of empire.  
In the end, the Cold War project to map the extent of human disease strove for an 
idealized image by pointedly taking a deliberately global approach. May’s combination of the 
“pathogen” with the “geogen” was not just a scientifically significant connection, but a rhetorical 
one as well. The world on the flat page, through the bounded lines of the map, could now be 
“diagnosed” and its weak spots and sicknesses absorbed in one visual field. The visual charting 
of developing nations and their literal and figurative health became a vital representation of 
North/South relations in the expansion of the Cold War. Cartography provided the necessary 
abstraction of individual human suffering from disease, so that health could be aggregated as 
both a regional and global world problem to be solved through economic and cultural 
development by powerful, expert, intervening world actors. 
To return to the broader implications of this study for rhetorical scholars, the 
contributions ultimately rest, perhaps, on the central role of visuality in constructing and 
maintaining the spaces of power across the globe. This study contributes to both the scholarly 
conversations in the areas of visual rhetoric and interdisciplinary Cold War rhetoric, history, and 
geography by tracing the spatial logics, assumptions, and ideologies behind the powerful 
partitioning of a decolonizing world. Scholars critiquing the rhetoric of maps can trace in this 
study the naturalization of cartographic claims as scientific managers for so-called “big data” 
around an expanding array of social, economic, and political issues, particularly at a pivotal time 
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when cartography and geography were being hailed into the powerful spaces of international 
development by US American elites. Similarly, Cold War rhetoric scholars can see cartography 
as a productive entry point into tracing how strategic and ideological approaches work together 
in practice. The realist goals of protecting American national interests always existed alongside a 
liberal belief that scientific management could develop an unequal world, and this productive 
tension could be seen right on the flat pages of the era’s maps.  
Perhaps most importantly though, this essay unites these two conversations in rhetorical 
studies to make the point that cartography, from its production processes to its symbolic 
conventions to its circulation, underwrote the construction of a Cold War world of which we still 
feel the effects. Maps were not simply a byproduct of, or an ancillary to, the Cold War. The 
conflict absolutely required the special inventional resources of maps and their abilities to simply, 
classify, and divide political space. Put simply, cartography actively shaped and bounded the 
abstract ground on which the Cold War was fought, drawing distinct visual boundaries between 
East/West and, increasingly throughout its duration, North/South. Therefore, the case of the Atlas 
of Disease remains vital because it represents a central rhetorical tension of the Cold War and 
beyond: how Americans navigate an immense fear of contamination (in both physical and 
ideological senses) against the idealistic hope that the United States can somehow cleanse the 
world with medicine, capital, and even cartography. Through complex, multi-institutional 
international initiatives like the AOD, we see how global data is a discourse of fluidity, shaped 
and politicized by a variety of powerful interests. It is in the overlap between these political 
interests where productive work on the evolution of American rhetoric is yet to be done, work 
that can often only trace out these entanglements through the careful mining of available archives 
(and the inevitable silences in those archives as well). The job of rhetorical critics will be to 
continue contextualizing these intersections for other ideologies in other cases. In many ways, 
figures like Jacques May become way stations for a host of such evolving, shifting discourses 
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and interests. Situating such figures and global projects in this way allows us to trace the 
latitudes and longitudes of American power through the complexities and anxieties of its global 
ascendance.  
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